University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2018

Enforcing the Decisions of the People Book
Reviews
Joel I. Colon-Rios

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Colon-Rios, Joel I., "Enforcing the Decisions of the People Book Reviews" (2018). Constitutional Commentary. 1170.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1170

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
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ENFORCING THE DECISIONS
OF “THE PEOPLE”
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS. By
Yaniv Roznai.1 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017. Pp.
xxiv + 334. $75.00 (cloth).
Joel I. Colón-Ríos2
Constitutional amendments can be “unconstitutional” in two
main ways. First, they could be contrary to explicit limits to the
amending power contained in the constitutional text itself.
Second, they could be contrary to the fundamental principles in
which the constitution rests. Although unamendability does not
necessarily need to be judicially enforceable, the doctrine of
unconstitutional
constitutional
amendments
is
usually
accompanied by the idea that courts can declare the invalidity of
an unconstitutional amendment. Each form of unamendability—
explicit and implicit—involves its own particular problems, but
they both raise a common set of questions. Yaniv Roznai’s
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of
Amendment Powers, is, to my knowledge, the first book to deal
with these problems and questions from both a theoretical and
comparative (global) perspective. The book introduces readers to
the subject through a rich historical account of the development
of the doctrine, examines the current practice of explicit and
implicit amendability in different jurisdictions and regions,
advances a theory about the nature and scope of the amending
power, and examines the question about whether the doctrine
should be judicially enforced. In this brief review, far from
providing a detailed summary of those discussions, I will make
three comments that are directly connected to some of the main
1.
(IDC).
2.
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arguments presented by Roznai. In so doing, I hope to contribute
to the debate that this important book is likely to continue to
generate among constitutional theorists and comparative
constitutional lawyers.
My comments apply to both forms of amendability, unless
otherwise indicated. I will suggest, first, that the doctrine has an
uneasy relationship with conservative and radical democratic
notions of constitutionalism; second, that the distinction between
the secondary and primary constituent power, defended through
the book, is difficult to sustain in some contexts; and, third, that
given the fact that most constitutions do not authorise their own
democratic replacement, the judicial enforcement of the doctrine
can only be justified exceptionally. Although these comments
challenge some aspects of Roznai’s approach, it will also be clear
that I largely agree with the argument presented in the book.
I would like to begin where the book ends. Roznai notes in
his conclusion, and I agree, that the alleged paradoxical character
of the very idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment
disappears once the doctrine is “correctly construed” (p. 233). As
long as the ordinary amending power (the secondary constituent
power) is understood as distinct from the exclusive constitutionmaking power of the people (the primary constituent power), there
is nothing paradoxical in noting that the former cannot be used to
change the existing constitution in ways so fundamental that
amount to the creation of a new one. As I have noted elsewhere,3
however, the doctrine carries with it a different sort of paradox.
On the one hand, particularly in the context of implicit
unamendability, it is a profoundly conservative doctrine: it is
about preserving the basic principles on which the constitution
rests, just because they are the basic principles in which the
constitution rests (that is, not because, for example, they are
particularly good principles).
In this respect, the doctrine is conservative for the worst
reason possible: it wants to preserve what exists just because it
exists. The doctrine, however, also has a radical democratic
potential. To the extent that it only applies to the amending
power, it is not binding on “the people,” who can change or
replace those basic principles at any moment. Since the exercise
3. Joel I. Colón-Ríos, On Albert’s Unconstitutional Constitutions, 50 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 17, 17 (2017).
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of the primary constituent power has traditionally been
understood as extra-legal or extra-constitutional, what the
doctrine suggests is that political acts that are sufficiently massive,
popular, or participatory, can legitimately operate besides (or
perhaps despite) a constitution’s amendment rule. Thus, on the
one hand, this is a very conservative doctrine; on the other, it is a
very radical one. In his book, Roznai explores both sides of that
paradox. Indeed, as he shows, in the United States, conservative
lawyers and politicians were the ones who, in the past, tended to
defend the notion of implicit limits on the amending power. For
example, John Calhoun, the pro-slavery politician and
commentator, argued that an amendment that is “inconsistent
with the character of the constitution and the ends for which it was
established—or with the nature of the system” (p. 41)—would be
ultra vires the amending power. At the same time, Roznai
recognizes the potential revolutionary character of the doctrine:
“The fear of revolution is a legitimate concern that should act as
a warning for constitutional designers to use unamendability
carefully” (p. 131). This is why, he writes, the “further
development of how the primary constituent power may
peacefully ‘resurrect’ and change even unamendable
constitutional subjects” is important (p. 131).4
It could be argued that the doctrine is only conservative
superficially, that in the last instance, it is its radical nature that
characterizes it. The reason why certain basic principles cannot be
changed through the ordinary amendment process, this argument
would hold, is precisely because those principles were established
by the people, the primary constituent power, at the time the
constitution was created. Accordingly, government officials who
have been authorised by the people to amend “the constitution”
cannot use that power, a secondary constituent power, to alter the
basic principles in which the constitution rests. That would
amount to the creation of a new constitution, not as the
amendment of an already existing one. The problem with this
argument, which Roznai largely defends in his book (and I have

4. Roznai does not engage in a detailed discussion of how the primary constituent
power should be exercised. However, he directs readers to his forthcoming article, Yaniv
Roznai, “We the People,” “Oui, the People” and the Collective Body: Perceptions of
Constituent Power, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Gary Jacobsohn &
Miguel Schor eds., forthcoming 2018).
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defended in my own work)5 is that, in the context of certain
constitutions, it is based on an assumption that is empirically false.
As a matter of actual constitutional practice, many constitutions
are not adopted through processes that could be reasonably
described as amounting to an “act of the people,” but by ordinary
legislatures (sometimes even without a referendum) acting
through processes similar to the ones that characterise ordinary
amendment rules. For example, to say that a particular provision
of the United States Constitution should be unamendable by the
U.S. Congress and the state legislatures acting through Article V
because it reflects a fundamental principle adopted by “the
people,” is to assume that the Constitution was adopted through
an inclusive and participatory process. There could be other
reasons why a particular provision should be considered
unamendable, but the idea that it should be unamendable because
of its alleged popular origin is untenable in some contexts.
The apparently radical character of the doctrine, in the case
of many constitutions, would thus rest in the (false) assumption
that the existing constitution was created by “the people,” which
would lead to the not necessarily correct conclusion that it should
therefore be put out of the scope of the secondary constituent
power. The implication would be, and this leads me to my second
comment, that the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendments should only apply in the context of constitutions that
have been created through highly democratic procedures. In
other words, constitutions that can somehow be seen as having
been created by “the people.” A hypothetical example would be
useful to illustrate this point. Suppose that a democratically
elected parliament adopts a new constitution with no form of
direct popular intervention. The new constitution contains an
amendment rule that authorises its revision through a process that
involves: (1) a referendum on whether a Constituent Assembly
shall be elected to draft a new constitution; (2) a special election
in which the members of that body are selected; and (3) a final
referendum in which the draft constitution can be ratified or
rejected. Both the initial creation of a constitution by parliament
and its amendment by a Constituent Assembly could be described
as democratic, but let’s suppose that most observers would tend
to view the second process as more democratic (as will probably
5. See JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER (2012).
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be the case). To avoid unnecessary complications, let’s also
suppose that the constitution contains an explicit limit on the
amending power which prohibits any amendment that abolishes
the upper house of the legislature.
If a Constituent Assembly operating under the process
described above decided to abolish the upper house, would it be
appropriate for a court to invalidate its decision on the basis that
“the people,” in the exercise of their primary constituent power,
decided that the upper house of parliament cannot be abolished
through the amendment process? This example, in my view,
suggests that distinguishing between the primary and the
secondary constituent power on the basis that the former
necessarily has a better claim to represent, or to speak on behalf
of, the people, is highly problematic in some cases. Roznai is
aware of this problem and provides a solution (the “spectrum of
constitutional amendment powers”) that at first sight appears
satisfactory: “The more similar the characteristics of the
secondary constituent power are to those of the democratic
primary constituent power . . . the less it should be bound by
limitations, including those of judicial scrutiny, and vice versa” (p.
162). Nevertheless, the question still remains whether the
distinction between the secondary and the primary constituent
power can be sustained at all in cases where the amendment
procedure is more “popular” or “democratic” than—or, perhaps,
as popular or democratic as—the process used in the actual
creation of the existing constitution. However unusual such a case
may be in practice, it forces us to think about the extent to which
the democratic potential of the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendments depends on what actually happened
when the constitution was created and on the procedures (if any)
that it provides for its own replacement.
The final comment, which follows directly from the previous
point, is about whether the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendments should only apply when there is a
possibility to legally trigger an exercise of primary constituent
power. My example above was from a certain perspective
deceptive, because it could be argued that in cases where the
constitution authorises the convocation of a Constituent
Assembly as the one I described earlier, the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendments simply does not
apply. That is to say, when a popularly elected Constituent
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Assembly proposes fundamental constitutional changes that are
later ratified in a referendum, it should be understood as a proper
means for the exercise of the primary constituent power (and,
therefore, as “unbound by prior constitutional rules” (p. 233)).
This would be particularly true in cases where there is a tieredamendment rule, and (in a way consistent with Roznai’s spectrum
of constitutional amendment powers) one could say that the less
demanding process would be subject to limits while the more
demanding (both in terms of difficulty and degrees of popular
involvement), would not. But all this raises, in my view, a basic
question about the judicial enforcement of the doctrine. Should
judges be authorized to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendments in situations in which there are no
legal means available for the exercise of the primary constituent
power? In those cases, legally speaking, the court would have the
very final word as to what counts as acceptable constitutional
content.
Roznai does not agree with such an approach. He thinks, in
my view correctly, that a judicial declaration of invalidity should
not necessarily close the door to fundamental constitutional
changes: “Unamendability does not block all the democratic
paths for constitutional change, but simply announces that one
such path, namely the amendment process, is unapproachable for
amending certain constitutional subjects” (p. 189). Since
unamendability only limits the secondary constituent power,
Roznai continues, “it is entirely consistent with ‘the people’s’
sovereignty, as manifested by the primary constituent power
through which they can constitute a new constitutional order” (p.
190). Under this view, when a court declares a constitutional
amendment invalid, it does not negate but vindicates the people’s
will (p. 193). The problem, as suggested above, is that this is not
the reality of most constitutional orders (including constitutional
orders that have already embraced the notion of judicially
enforceable unamendability). Modern constitutions rarely
contain a mechanism, outside the ordinary amendment rule,
which involves popular participation to an extent that it can be
seen as a proper means for the exercise of the primary constituent
power. In the context of such a (typical) constitution, the judicial
application of the doctrine would make fundamental
constitutional changes a legal impossibility. It would seem that a
system like that would be in some way defective, in the sense that
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it makes certain rules only changeable through revolution. Given
the prevailing approach to the exercise of primary constituent
power, perhaps the judicial enforcement of the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendments can only be justified
in a handful of jurisdictions, if at all.

